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Abstract: The article examines the new trends of Hungarian constitutionalism, which have been realized in the 
new Fundamental Law and that raises some questions with regard to, among other things, the hierarchy of sources 
of law. Especially the cardinal laws have been the subject of criticisms both within the Hungarian doctrine that by 
experts in constitutional law and international organizations in the Western world. From the point of view of 
comparative constitutional law, it should be noted that reinforced laws are provided in many constitutions, in both 
Western and Eastern Europe. In order to better understand the role of cardinal laws is useful to consider, fi rst of all 
and in addition to the new Fundamental Law, the system of pre-existing organic laws of Hungary. Furthermore, it 
is also interesting to consider, on the one hand, the fi rst cardinal laws approved, and, on the other hand, the 
orientations of the Hungarian Constitutional Court on organic laws prior to the adoption of the new Fundamental 
Law.
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1. Among the controversial aspects of the “Partisan” Hungarian Constitution, criticized 
both by the Hungarian scholarship and the European institutions, there are some aspects 
regarding the sources of law1 governed by the new Fundamental Law. In the Fundamental 
Law that came into force on 1 January 20122 there is, on the system of norms, a fi rst 
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1 For the importance of the system of sources of law in the study of comparative constitutional 
law see, in the Italian legal literature, Pizzorusso, A.: Sistema delle fonti e forma di Stato e di governo. 
Quaderni costituzionali, 1986, 217 ff., where the author investigates the existence of a relationship 
between the hierarchy of sources depending on the intensity of their legal effect and hierarchy of the 
state bodies according to their degree of representativeness. In general, on the primary role of the 
(individual) sources of law for the knowledge of public/constitutional law (of any country), see ex 
multis Groppi, T.–Simoncini, A.: Introduzione allo studio del diritto pubblico e delle sue fonti. Torino, 
2011; Palermo, F.: La produzione giuridica e i sistemi delle fonti. In: Carrozza, P.–Di Giovine, A.–
Ferrari, G. F. (eds): Diritto costituzionale comparato. Roma–Bari, 2011, 3rd ed., 819 ff; Pino, G.: La 
gerarchia delle fonti del diritto. Costruzione, decostruzione, ricostruzione. In: Ars interpretandi. 
Annuario di ermeneutica giuridica. 2011, 19 ff., who examines criteria of hierarchy and competence 
in the construction of the system of sources, noting that to determine the order of the rules is as 
important as producing them and perhaps even more. 
2 See the analytical comments, relating to (also) the system of sources, of Kovács, K.–Tóth, A. 
G.: Hungary’s Constitutional Transformation. European Constitutional Law Review, 2011, 183 ff., 
and Kovács, G.: Ungarns neue Verfassung – In Kraft 1. Januar 2012. Osteuropa Recht, 2011, 253 ff. 
In the Italian legal doctrine, see Ferrari G. F. (ed.): La nuova Legge fondamentale ungherese. Torino, 
2012. A recent comparative picture on the constitutional democracies of Central Europe was carried 
out by Tóth, A. G.: From Uneasy Compromises to Democratic Partnership: The Prospects of Central 
European Constitutionalism. Acta Juridica Hungarica, Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies, 2011, 
220 ff., also published with some modifi cations in the European Journal of Law Reform, 2011, 80 ff. 
141THE HUNGARIAN FUNDAMENTAL LAW, THE NEW CARDINAL LAWS...
arrangement, represented by Article R, which does not seem to cause particular issues, 
unlike the subsequent rulings of Article T, that, however, led to severe criticism, both 
international and “domestic”. 
Article R is limited, in fact, to establish that the Fundamental Law is the essential basis 
of the Hungarian legal system, and that the constitutional provisions are superior to the 
laws passed by the National Parliament.3 Nor does it seem innovative, in view of 
comparative Eastern European post-socialist law, in the fact that the third paragraph of 
Article R claims specifi cally that the provisions of the Fundamental Law shall be construed 
in accordance with the statements contained in the Preamble to the Constitution.4 Given, in 
fact, that the Preamble of the Constitution is inserted after the heading »Fundamental Law«, 
in line with what has previously been noted by a careful analysys specifi cally dedicated to a 
comparative perspective of the legal nature of the preambles of the constitutions of post-
communist Eastern Europe,5 does not appear that there may be doubts about the legally 
mandatory and not merely political-programmatic character of the Preamble of the new 
Hungarian Fundamental Law. More specifi cally, by virtue of reference6 by which the 
Preamble is an integral part of the Fundamental Law, and to the extent that the Preamble is 
placed after the naming of the Constitution, it follows that the Preamble does not have the 
same direct normative character7 as the other constitutional provisions, but still exerts 
3 See the fi rst paragraph of art. R. 
4 See the careful analysis of the importance and role of the preambles of the constitutions of 
post-communist countries of Eastern Europe conducted by Kutlešić, V.: Les constitutions 
postcommunistes européennes. Étude de droit comparé de neuf États, foreword by Milačić, S. 
Brussels, Bruylant, 2009, 17 ff. (translated from the original in Serbian language). The solution was 
not different in Socialist countries: see Jovii, M.: O ustavu [On Constitution]. Beograd, Savremena 
administracija, 1977, 138, which affi rms the legal strength of texts (preambles, attachments, etc.) that 
are an integral part of the Constitution. On the theme, a classic is the study of Häberle, P.: Präambeln 
im Text und Kontext von Verfassungen. In: Listl, J.–Schambeck, H. (eds): Demokratie in Anfechtung 
und Bewährung. Festschrift für J. Broermann. Berlin, 1982, 211 ff., where the distinction between the 
preamble to the constitution and the preamble of the constitution. More recently, see Orgad, L.: The 
preamble in constitutional interpretation. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2010, 714 ff., 
who distinguishes the three types of symbolic preamble, interpretive preamble and substantive 
preamble. In Italy, see Frosini, J. O.: Il preambolo. Quaderni costituzionali, 2003, 387 ff., who 
critically discusses the legal nature of the preambles of the constitutions, moving from the minimum 
level of mere proclamation (devoid of any legally binding), then considering the intermediate level of 
programmatic value and fi nally achieving the maximum value (even ) “super-constitutional”. On the 
question of the value attributable to the introductory texts of constitutions, as a matter under 
consideration in the comparative-historical perspective, see now Coutant, A.: De la valeur d’un texte 
introductif: la Constitution française de 1848 et son Préamble. Revue française de droit constitutionnel, 
2011, 681 ff. There are, of course, in comparative constitutional studies positions that instead tend, 
already many years ago, to limit the importance of the introductory texts of constitutions: in this 
sense, see mainly the refl ections of Esmein, A.: Éléments de droit constitutionnel français et comparé 
(1889). Paris, Éditions Panthéon-Assas/Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 2001 
(réédition), 554 ff. 
5 See Kutlešić: op. cit. 17 ff. 
6 In the third paragraph of Article R of the Fundamental Law.
7 That is, a binding force. 
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considerable infl uence in terms of primary standards, as required by the fundamental goals 
and values of the constitutional order. Ultimately, the Preamble of the new Hungarian lex 
fundamentalis infl uences the adoption, interpretation and application of the other lower-
level norms. 
2. Not little controversial issues are concerning Article T of the Fundamental Law of 
Hungary. The constitutional provision in question provides for the adoption and amendment 
of the so-called cardinal laws, or organic laws,8 for whose approval is required the majority 
of two thirds of the votes cast by members present in the Parliament. 
From a theoretical point of view, organic laws have a dual function, which determines 
a certain ambiguity of the laws themselves. On the one hand, they serve to secure the 
parliamentary minorities in respect of decisions that may be adopted by transient majorities. 
On the other hand, organic laws are likely to determine rigidities concerning some choices 
of the legislature, in order to make parliamentary decisions more diffi cult to modify in the 
course of subsequent legislatures.9 This margin of ambiguity, as discussed in the pages that 
follow, it is signifi cantly expressed in the new Hungarian constitutional order, in view of the 
wide use by the new Fundamental Law of the institution of cardinal laws. 
The provision of Article T has been widely criticized, both internationally and by 
Hungarian scholars. Starting from the latter, very interesting as it allows to know the 
“internal” point of view, it was observed10 that the provision introduces a kind of limitation 
to the realization of the democratic will, to the extent that the voters who do not approve the 
line of conduct of the government in offi ce can only with diffi culty obtain a change of 
government policy in successive legislatures, since the simple majority cannot change what 
was previously established by cardinal/organic laws. The discipline enacted by cardinals 
laws is, in fact, less fl exible than the one provided by ordinary laws. Problems arise 
considering that there are numerous cases in which the Fundamental Law provides the 
necessary adoption of a cardinal law.
Such cases are related to thirty nine areas of the legal order.11 They are, inter alia but 
primarily, the fi eld of family discipline, the Fundamental Law stipulates that the marriage is 
  8 In Hungarian, sarkalatos törvény. 
 9 See de Morais, C. B.: Le fi nalità politiche delle leggi rinforzate. Quaderni costituzionali, 
1998, 27 ff. On the category of »leggi rinforzate«, in relation to the Italian legal system, see Ferrari, 
G.: Le leggi rinforzate nell’ordinamento italiano. Id., Studi sulla Costituzione, Milano, 1958, II, 479 
ff., who examines the articles 99, 132 and 133 of the Italian Constitution. 
10 See Chronowski, N.: The New Hungarian Constitution in the European Context University of 
Trento European Coustitutional Law Student’s Seminar Series. See also the views expressed at the 
Roundtable Discussion »Debating the Hungarian Constitution«, held March 2, 2012 at the Department 
of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute (EUI) in Badia Fiesolana 
(Florence), with speeches by József Szájer, Zita Gurmai, Gábor Halmai and András Jakab, to which 
are to be added the views of Hamza, G. Puppinck and R. Toniatti at the conference »Concetti e 
principi del diritto romano e la nuova Costituzione ungherse«, held in Rome March 12, 2012 at the 
Department of Law of the University LUMSA (Libera Università Maria Ss. Assunta), as well as of 
Roberto Toniatti and Laura Montanari at the study meeting on »Europa e democrazia: il caso 
ungherese«, held at the Law Faculty of the University of Parma April 20, 2012. 
11 See the detailed examination of Csink, L.–Schanda, B.–Varga, A. Z. (eds): The Basic Law of 
Hungary. A First Commentary. Dublin (National Institute of Public Administration-NIPA/Nemzeti 
Közigazgatási Intézet-NKI, Hungary), 2012, 16 ff. 
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provided solely when the union is between man and woman, according to the third 
paragraph of Article L. Many aspects are related to the organization of public powers, such 
as the appointment of ministers and other senior civil servants, under the fourth paragraph 
of Article 17, and the term of offi ce of the administrative authorities responsible for 
regulation and control, who are appointed by the Prime Minister or, at the proposal of the 
same, by the President of the Republic, as well as the scope of the powers conferred to the 
heads of autonomous regulatory bodies, based on the provisions contained, respectively, in 
the second and fourth paragraph of Article 23. There are also key aspects of the judicial 
system, namely the organization and administration of the courts and the legal status and 
remuneration of judges, in accordance with the provisions in the seventh paragraph of 
Article 25. Are contemplated very large areas, which are indicated in Article 40 of the 
Constitution, i.e. the basic rules of public fi nance, the pension system and provisions for 
public service delivery. The cardinal laws are relating to fi nancial institutions and control, 
such as the provisions concerning the organization and operation of the State Audit Offi ce, 
in accordance with the provisions contained in the fourth paragraph of Article 43, and the 
operational rules regarding the Budget Council, as provided for by the fourth paragraph of 
Article 44. Cardinal laws are provided with respect to the supreme command of the Armed 
Forces, attributed to Parliament, President, National Council of Defense, Government and 
Minister responsible, on the basis of the Constitution and of (one or more) cardinal laws, as 
stipulated in the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Fundamental Law,12 and also for the 
rules concerning the organization and functioning of the police and national security 
services, as well as provisions relating to methods of espionage and intelligence agencies, 
according to the sixth paragraph of Article 46. Last but not least, cardinal laws are to 
regulate both individual and collective rights of nationalities, that of national minorities, as 
well as rules for the election of their self-governing bodies both local and national, pursuant 
to the provisions in the third paragraph of Article 29.13
12 The fi fth and last paragraph of Article 45 of the Fundamental Law further states that the 
detailed rules on organization, tasks, supreme command, management and practical operation of the 
Hungarian Armed Forces should be established through the adoption of a cardinal law. 
13 For a few brief remarks on the matters to be regulated by cardinal laws, see: Kelemen, K.: 
Una nuova Costituzione per l’Ungheria. Quaderni costituzionali, 2011, specifi cally 682 f; Di 
Gregorio, A.: La Costituzione ungherese del 25 Aprile 2011: è davvero tutto così nuovo? Qualche 
osservazione in libertà, working papers published on the website »Diritto Pubblico dei Paesi 
dell’Europa Orientale (DIPEO)«, available at http:// users. unimi. it/ dirpubesteuropa (doc. dated 9-7-
2011); De Capitani, E.: Unione europea e Ungheria: verso un nuovo caso »Haider«?, in the website 
»Diritti Comparati. Comparare i diritti fondamentali in Europa« (doc. dated 11-1-2012), who (sub La 
riforma costituzionale ungherese nel contesto dello spazio pubblico dell’Unione) speaks of thirty laws 
that must be approved to implement the new constitutional text. Most widely, see Courrier, A. E.: À 
propos des «évènements politiques en Hongrie«… Quelques clés pour en comprendre le débat 
juridique. Revue internationale de droit comparé, 2012, 310 ff. (sub II, L’objet du débat – Les lois 
cardinales, 315 ff.). On the controversial political-party background of the new Hungarian 
Fundamental Law, see for example: Bottoni, S.: L’Ungheria di Viktor Orbán. Il Mulino. Rivista 
bimestrale di cultura e di politica, 2011, 1006 ff; Rühle, A.: Populismo di governo a Budapest. 
Internazionale, June (2011) 900, 38 ff; Fabbrini, F.: L’Ungheria, i diritti fondamentali e l’Unione 
Europea: è tempo di attivare l’art. 7 TUE?, in the website »Diritti Comparati. Comparare i diritti 
fondamentali in Europa« (at the Internet address cited supra, doc. dated 16-1-2012); Dau, F.: Ungheria 
– La Commissione europea avvia la procedura di infrazione, in the website »Diritto Pubblico dei 
Paesi dell’Europa Orientale (DIPEO)« (doc. dated 29-1-2012); Pidd, H.: La svolta dell’Ungheria. 
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In the Hungarian legal literature it has been criticized, in particular, the choice to 
regulate by cardinal laws the areas of social policy and the tax, as it addresses matters that 
would otherwise require an adequate degree of fl exibility.14 
The reservations expressed with regard to the constitutional discipline of cardinal laws 
by a part of the Hungarian doctrine are also refl ected, in an extent amplifi ed, in some 
important documents adopted at the international level, particularly by the Council of 
Europe, Venice Commission and European Parliament.15
The fi rst (chronologically) international statement to be analyzed is that of the Council 
of Europe, invested of the examination of three specifi c legal questions concerning the then 
proposed new Constitution of Hungary by the same Government of Budapest. The points 
51–52 of the Opinion n. 614 of 28 March 2011 prepared by the European Commission for 
Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)16 relates to the future regulation of the 
Hungarian Constitution about cardinal/organic laws. In the Opinion, the question concerning 
cardinal laws is examined in connection with the analysis of the powers of the Constitutional 
Court in the draft new Constitution. In particular, the Venice Commission focuses on the 
problem of identifying the exact scope of the cardinal laws in the system of sources of law. 
Must, above all, clarify whether the cardinal laws–or organic laws–are subject to judicial 
control of constitutionality, or if they themselves represent a benchmark for reviewing the 
compliance with the Constitution of ordinary laws. The Venice Commission recommends 
that the fi rst of the above solutions will be favourite, namely the subjection (also) of the 
cardinal laws to the judicial control of constitutional legality. In this case, however, a further 
problem lays, highlighted by the Venice Commission Opinion of March 2011. If, in fact, 
many fundamental aspects of the regulatory system in Hungary are regulated by organic 
laws, however, and not in the Constitution, it follows probably the danger of a sort of lack 
in constitutional review.17 For these reasons, the Venice Commission pointed out in the 
Internazionale, January (2012) 931, 14 ff., who speaks of »authoritarian constitution«; Tóth, G.: La 
svolta ungherese spiegata ai marziani. Limes. Rivista italiana di geopolitica, (2012) 2, 305 ff., who 
denies that there was the feared autocratic turn; Scheppele, K. L.: The Unconstitutional Constitution. 
New York Times, 2-1-2012; Nadler, J.: Why Hungary’s New Constitution Could Be Bad for Europe. 
Time, 5-1-2012; Association Européenne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (AEDH), La 
nouvelle Constitution hongroise: une menace pour la démocratie et les droit. Bruxelles, AEDH, 
January 2012; Miklós, T. G.: Hongrie, laboratoire d’une nouvelle droite. Le Monde diplomatique, 
February 2012, 3, who states that the values which inspire the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
are »travail, foyer, famille, nation, jeunesse, santé et ordre«; de Montety H.: La Hongrie en Europe. 
Revue des Deux Mondes, April 2012, 139 ff., where an examination of the changement de régime and 
a consideration of the Hungarian case as révélateur d’un dilemme européen. 
14 See Chronowski: op. cit. 14.
15 For an effective synthesis, see Kelemen, K.: The New Hungarian Constitution: Domestic and 
European Criticalities, University of Trento European Coustitutional Law Student’s Seminar Series.
16 The Venice Commission document (available on the Internet at http:// www. venice. coe. int.) 
has been prepared by a special working group, composed of fi ve members. It was approved by the 
Venice Commission at its plenary session held in Venice from 25 to 26 March 2011. The components 
of the working group were the Austrian C. Grabenwarter, the German W. Hoffman-Riem, the Polish 
H. Suchocka, the Finnish K. Tuori and the Belgian J. Velaers. 
17 In this sense it is set the fi nal step of paragraph 51 of Opinion no. 614/2011. There it is stated, 
also, that »An extensive use of “cardinal laws” might lead to edging in stone the subjects regulated by 
such laws«. 
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Opinion concerned that the discipline of the profi les of greatest relevance should be 
regulated directly in the Constitution, and not by sources of lower rank like cardinal/organic 
laws. This is true, the Commission concluded, for both rulings concerning the organization 
and functioning of the organs of the State and with regard to guarantees, and in particular 
the level of protection that must be constitutional, of individual rights and fundamental 
freedoms.18
The Venice Commission returned to examine the Hungarian Fundamental Law even 
after the adoption, on 18 April 2011, of the fi nal text of the new Constitution by the 
Hungarian National Parliament. The request for action by the Venice Commission was 
presented this time by the Monitoring Committee set up by the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe (PACE). The Opinion no. 621 of 20 June 2011 was accordingly 
adopted by the Venice Commission at its Eighty-seventh plenary session, held in Venice 
from 17 to 18 June 2011.19 In paragraphs 22–27 the Opinion of the Venice Commission 
deals with the cardinal laws contemplated by the new Hungarian Constitutional Charter. 
First, the Venice Commission notes that there are over fi fty references contained in the 
Fundamental Law to matters to be regulated in the future by cardinal/organic laws, in 
addition of course to Article T where there is the defi nition of the cardinal law. The result –
according to the Commission–is that the main aspects of the Hungarian regulatory system 
will henceforth be governed by cardinal/organic laws.20
The Commission goes on to note that Hungarian cardinal laws are certainly not a 
unique situation in comparative law, where there are several experiences in which there are 
national organic laws.21 The feature of Hungarian cardinal laws would be to make more 
diffi cult to change the rules that relate to specifi c matters, which are suffi ciently important 
to be removed from the realm of ordinary/simple laws, but at the same time need not be 
directly governed by constitutional rules. Ultimately, cardinal/organic laws are not of 
superprimary level, although for their approval (as well as for their modifi cation) is 
established the need for a supermajority, not less than two-thirds of the members of 
Parliament present. 
The Venice Commission, in the Opinion under consideration,22 recognized also that 
organic laws are already provided by the Hungarian constitutional law at the time of entry 
into force of the new Fundamental Law. However, and this is the problematic profi le that 
the Commission intends to highlight, the concern stems mainly from the fact that cardinals 
or organic laws are contemplated in the new Constitution of Hungary in an exceptionally 
large manner, far beyond the traditionally issues covered in comparative law by organic 
laws, as is the case especially for the electoral law or regulations for parliamentary 
procedure.
18 See paragraph 52 of the Opinion cited in the note above. 
19 The Opinion no. 621/2011 is available online at the website http:// www. venice. coe. int. The 
members of the working group were the same already part of the working group created for the 
adoption of Opinion no. 614/2011 (on the latter, see above). 
20 See point 22 of the Opinion no. 621/2011. 
21 In the Italian doctrine, see widely Pegoraro, L.: Le leggi organiche. Profi li comparatistici. 
Padova, CEDAM, 1990, and, by the same author and with specifi c reference to the legal systems of 
Central and Eastern post-socialist countries, the essay entitled: Il sistema delle fonti giuridiche nelle 
Costituzioni dell’Est europeo. Quaderni costituzionali, 1995, 111 ff. 
22 See point 23.
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Going into detail, the Venice Commission notes that the constitutional regulation of 
the judicial system should be more analytical at the superprimary level, while the devolution 
of powers relating to the scope of legislation to be adopted with a supermajority is too 
extensive, that is through cardinal/organic laws. Moreover, the regulation concerning family 
social rights and tax law should be subtracted from the excessive intrusiveness of the 
cardinal laws, in order to provide greater fl exibility to the provisions relating to the areas 
indicated. In other words, these are areas that should be regulated by ordinary laws, 
approved by a simple rather than two-thirds majority.23 In particular, is a convincing 
argument that of the Venice Commission for whom »Funcionality of a democratic system is 
rooted in its permanent ability to change. The more policy issues are transferred beyond the 
powers of simply majority, the less signifi cance will future elections have and the more 
possibilities does a two-thirds majority have of cementing its political preferences and the 
country’s legal order«.24 In conclusion, the Venice Commission noted that the scope of the 
cardinal laws appears unusually extended in the new Hungarian Constitution and so, it 
being understood that Member States are free to determine both the level of detail of the 
provisions of constitutional law that the different levels of internal legislation,25 the 
Commission moves towards a desirable narrowing of areas regulated by organic laws.26 
The criticisms made by the Venice Commission were specifi cally mentioned and, 
therefore, reiterated by the European Parliament, by the resolution on the new Hungarian 
Constitution, adopted27 on 1 July 2011. In particular, in considerings L-N the resolution of 
the European Parliament examines Hungarian constitutional provisions concerning cardinal 
laws. It is noted in the resolution that the new Fundamental Law of Hungary establishes a 
wider use of the cardinal laws, in a manner such that their adoption can be defi ned as part of 
»the new Hungarian constitutional process«.28 It added that the adoption of specifi c and 
detailed rules through cardinal laws is likely to »endanger the principle of democracy«,29 
because they create »more scope for a government with a two-thirds majority in order to 
cement our political preferences«, with the further consequence of diminished signifi cance 
of future elections.30 Above all, it is the opinion of the European Parliament31 that »the 
cultural, religious, socio-economic and fi nancial politics should not be fi nally determined 
by cardinals laws«.32 Based on these grounds, the European Parliament resolution on the 
part of the examination covering the cardinal laws has, on the one hand, invited the 
Hungarian authorities to adopt cardinal laws that are restricted, in the largest number of 
cases, to contain principle provisions, i.e. to take only »the scope of the basic regulation, 
23 That is, according to rules of ordinary legislation and majoritarian politics, as is said in point 
24 of the Opinion. 
24 Thus is stated in point 24 of the Opinion. 
25 With provision, then, of the step of cardinal/organic law in addition to that of ordinary law. 
26 See points 25 and 27 of the Opinion.
27 With a majority of 331 votes in favor and 274 against. 
28 See the considering L, in the end. 
29 See the considering M.
30 See the considering quoted in the note above.
31 Which shares the concerns expressed about this issue by the Venice Commission in the two 
opinions above analyzed. 
32 So in considering N.
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clearly defi ned«,33 so as not to unduly constrain future choices and decisions of 
democratically elected governments and parliaments, while on the other hand has asked the 
European Commission to exercise the necessary supervision on the organic laws to be 
adopted, »so check that they are consistent with the EU acquis and in particular the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and with the letter and spirit of the treaties«.34
In terms of comparison, it should be noted that there are currently legal systems of 
Western European countries and also of Eastern European post-communist countries that 
provide the organic laws. 
This is the case of France, where Article 46 of the Constitution of 1958 provided for 
the fi rst time organic laws in their modern version,35 designed to regulate important aspects 
of the organization of public powers,36 but not also the fundamental freedoms as is the case 
on the basis of Article 81 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978, which contains the 
33 See point 1, lett. b), of the European Parliament’s resolution. 
34 See point 2 of the resolution. 
35 See the comparative analysis of Pegoraro, L.–Rinella, A.: Le fonti nel diritto comparato. 
Torino, 2000, 75 ff. See also Amiel, H.: Les lois organiques. Revue du droit public et de la science 
politique en France et à l’étranger, 1984, 405 ff., who at p. 406 states that »La Constitution du 4 
octobre 1958 institue une nouvelle catégorie d’actes juridiques avec les lois organiques. L’existence 
de ce lois n’est certe pas récente puisqu’elle remonte à la Constitution de 1848. Mais, les nouvelles 
institutions de la France leur accordent una place et un rôle qu’elles n’avaient pas jusqu’à présent. En 
outre, la pratique est venue renforcer les caractères spécifi ques des lois organiques«. The same author 
adds (ibid.) that »Il faut cependant souligner que, au-delà des divergences juridiques relatives à la 
défi nition de ces actes, la fonction des lois organiques reste toujours la même. L’Histoire 
constitutionnelle de la France, come d’ailleurs les comparaisons que l’on peut faire avec les pays 
étrangeres, démonstrent que les lois organiques ont une fonction constante dans l’ordonnancement 
juridique: compléter la constitution et en fi xer les conditions d’application«. 
36 In the (not so wide) French legal literature, see Morange, G.: La hiérarchie des textes dans la 
Constitution du 4 octobre 1958. Recueil Dalloz, 1959, IV, Chronique, 21 ff.; Rousset, M.: La loi 
organique dans la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958. Recueil Sirey, 1960, XVIII, Chronique, 1 ss.; Sirat, 
C.: La loi organique et la Constitution de 1958, in Recueil Dalloz, 1960, XVIII, Chronique, 153 ff.; 
Amiel, H.: Les lois organiques. Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à 
l’étranger, op. cit., where the author highlights the caractére complémentaire des lois organiques, 
namely their nature of législation constitutionnelle complémentaire; Bérardo, J. P.: Les lois organiques 
dans l’ordonnancement constitutionnel français, in Scritti su le fonti normative e altri temi di vario 
diritto in onore di V. Crisafulli, II, Padova, CEDAM, 1985, 71 ff.; le Mire, P.: Article 46. In: Luchaire, 
F.–Conac, G. (eds): La Constitution de la République française. Paris, 1987, 2nd ed., 899 ff.; Mathieu, 
B.–Verpeaux, M. (eds): Les lois organiques et la mise en oeuvre de la révision constitutionnelle, 
Paris, Dalloz, 2009. For an unusual comparison, see also Saneewong Na Ayudthaya, K.: Les lois 
organiques: étude comparée France – Thaïlande. Analyse des lois organiques de France et Thaïlande. 
Saarbrücken, Éditions universitaires européennes, 2011. 
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constitutional rules on organic laws37 (already contemplated in the authoritarian legal 
system of Franco’s Spain38).
From the point of view of parliamentary procedure, the French organic laws cannot be 
approved, in the absence of agreement between the two Houses of Parliament, except with 
the affi rmative vote by an absolute majority of its members by the National Assembly on 
fi nal reading. Furthermore, the organic laws are not enacted until after the declaration of 
conformity to the Constitution by the Conseil constitutionnel.39 On the other hand, in the 
French constitutional system organic laws are approved by Parliament but, in some cases, 
37 In the wide Spanish legal literature, see: Bermejo Vera, J.: Las fuentes del derecho en la 
Constitución española de 1978. In: Ramírez, M. (ed.): Estudios sobre la Constitución española de 
1978. Zaragoza, 1979, 243 ff.; Gálvez Montes, J.: El ámbito material y formal de las leyes orgánicas. 
In: Dirección General de lo Contencioso del Estado: La Constitución Española y las Fuentes del 
Derecho. Madrid, 1979, II, 925 ff.; Martín Oviedo, J. M.: Tipología, jerarquía y producción de las 
normas en la Constitución española, ibid., 1294 ff.; Santamaría Pastor, J. A.: Las leyes orgánicas: 
Notas en torno a su naturaleza y procedimiento de elaboración. Revista del Departamento de Derecho 
Político, 1979, 46 ff.; Sosa Wagner, F.: Aproximación al tema de las leyes orgánicas. Civitas. Revista 
Española de Derecho Administrativo, (1979) 21, 199 ff.; Garrorena Morales, A.: El lugar de la ley en 
la Constitución española. Madrid, 1980; Id., Acerca de las leyes orgánicas y de su espuria naturaleza 
jurídica. Revista de Estudios Políticos, (1980) 13, 169 ff.; de la Quadra-Salcedo y Fernández del 
Castillo, T.: La Ley en la Constitución: leyes orgánicas. Civitas. Revista Española de Derecho 
Administrativo, (1980) 24, 37 ff.; Bastida Freijedo, F. J.: La naturaleza jurídica de las leyes orgánicas 
(Comentario bibliográfi co). Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional, (1981) 2, 285 ff.; Fernández, 
T.-R.: Las leyes orgánicas y el bloque de la constitucionalidad. Madrid, 1981; Gimeno Gamarra, R.: 
Estado de la reforma de las leyes orgánicas y procesales. La Ley. Revista jurídica española de 
doctrina, jurisprudencia y bibliografía, 1981, 821 ff.; Linde, E.: Las leyes orgánicas parciales en la 
doctrina del Tribunal Constitucional. Revista de Administración Pública, (1981) 94, 339 ff.; Id., Linde 
Paniagua, E.: Leyes orgánicas: (un estudio de legislación y jurisprudencia). Madrid, 1990; Prieto 
Sanchís, L.: Las leyes orgánicas y el principio de jerarquía normativa en la Constitución española de 
1978. Revista de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Complutense, (1981) 62, 125 ff.; Pemán 
Gavín, J. M.: Sobre las Leyes Orgánicas en el Derecho Español: algunas observaciones a propósito de 
la Jurisprudencia constitucional. Revista Vasca de Administración Pública/Herri-Arduralaritzako 
Euskal Aldizkaria, (1984) 9, 29 ff.; Id., Sobre las leyes orgánicas en el Derecho español: algunas 
observaciones a propósito de la jurisprudencia constitucional. In: Martín-Retortillo Baquer, L.: De la 
jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional. Seminario de profesores de la Facultad de Derecho. 
Zaragoza, 1985, 145 ff.; Jiménez-Blanco – Carrillo de Albornoz A.: De nuevo en torno a la leyes 
orgánicas, las bases y las competencias legislativas de las Comunidades Autónomas. Civitas. Revista 
Española de Derecho Administrativo, (1987) 53, 117 ff.; de Otto – Pardo, I.: Derecho constitucional. 
Sistema de fuentes. Barcelona, 1988, 2nd ed.; Romero Coloma, A. M.: Problematica de las leyes 
organicas. Actualidad Administrativa, (1993) 34, 431 ff.; Chofre Sirvent, J. F.: Signifi cado y función 
de las leyes orgánicas. Madrid, 1994; Barceló i Serramalera, M.: Leyes orgánicas, derechos 
fundamentales y Comunidades autónomas. In: Aparicio Pérez, M. A. (a cura di): Derechos 
constitucionales y pluralidad de ordenamientos. Barcelona, 2001, 435 ff; Id., La ley orgánica: ámbito 
material y posición en el sistema de fuentes. Barcelona, 2005; Cordón Moreno, F.: Leyes Orgánicas 
Procesales. Cizur Menor (Navarra), 2002. 
38 On the ideological bases of the Ley orgánica del Estado of January 10, 1967, see Montoro 
Ballestreros, A.: Ideologías y fuentes del derecho. Revista de Estudios Políticos, (1984) 40, 59 ff. 
39 On judicial review of constitutionality of organic laws in French legal system, see Luchaire, 
F.: Les lois organiques devant le Conseil constitutionnel. Revue du droit public et de la science 
politique en France et à l’étranger, 1992, 389 ff. 
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the Government may also adopt organic ordinances with equal value in terms of sources of 
law.40 
With regard to the organic laws of the post-authoritarian Spain, the second paragraph 
of Article 81 of the 1978 Constitution states that »La aprobación, modifi cación o derogación 
de las Leyes orgánicas exigirá mayoría absoluta del Congreso, en una votación fi nal sobre 
el conjunto del proyecto«. Unlike what happens in the French constitutional system, in 
Spain Articles 81–82 of the Constitution exclude that Parliament may authorize the 
Government to enact national organic texts through ordinances with the force of law. 
Organic laws are also contemplated in the Portuguese Constitution of 1976, after the 
1989 reform,41 as well as in Article 80 of the Greek Constitution of 1975, although in the 
latter case with characteristics of specialty.42 
If we now consider the Eastern European post-communist legal systems in relation to 
organic laws, some (probably) lesser known and (above all) most problematic aspects 
emerge. Areas governed by organic laws on the basis of the constitutions are more extensive 
than what happens in the West. 
This is the case, fi rst, of Albania, whose Constitution43 of 1998 contains a very 
analytical framework of the organic laws, which cover large areas of national and local 
levels regulations. Organic laws, in fact, dictate the rules for the organization both of central 
state and local governments. Under Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Constitution need the 
reinforced support of three-fi fths of the members of Parliament (Assembly) to pass laws 
concerning the organization and functioning of all institutions covered by the Constitution, 
the provisions on the legal status of public offi cials, the organization of territorial 
administration of the Albanian Republic. The right to vote is governed by organic laws, in 
relation to the nationality requirements of citizenship, the provisions concerning elections, 
political and administrative, general and local, as well as the regulation of referendums. 
And, also, the organic laws are related to all the rules contained in the codes, legislation on 
the state of emergency, the granting of amnesty.44 As one sees, there are really signifi cant 
areas of operation of the organic laws adopted by reinforced majority. On the other hand, 
both the organic laws and “normal” laws are subject, as stated by Article 85, paragraph 1, of 
the Constitution of Albania, to the power of the President of the Republic to postpone the 
bill passed in Parliament for review. By doing so, we see that, roughly in the same way that 
now in Hungary, in the Albanian case the organic laws are contemplated by the Constitution, 
cover large areas of the legal system, and also participate in some aspects of the general 
40 These are the ordonnaces portant loi organique, i.e. the so-called mesures organiques par 
voie d’ordonnance, on which see Maugius, R.: L’ordonnance en Droit public français contemporain. 
Lyon, Université de Lyon (Thèse doctorat), 1967. 
41 See Moreira da Silva, J. L.: Da lei orgânicas na Constituição da República Portuguesa. 
Lisboa, 1991; Blanco de Morais, C.: As leis reforçadas. As leis reforçadas pelo procedimenti no 
âmbito dos critérios estruturantes deas relações entre actos legislativos. Coimbra, 1998; Gomes 
Canotilho, J. J.: Il diritto costituzionale portoghese. Orrù, R. ed. (transl. of A. Ciammariconi, M. 
Mazza and R. Orrù), Torino, 2006, 173 f., where references to Articles 112.3 and 166.2 of the 
Portuguese Constitution. 
42 See Pantélis, A. M.: Les grands problèmes de la nuovelle Constitution hellenique, Foreword 
of L. Hamon, Paris, 1979, 288 ff.; Spyropoulos, P. C.–Fortsakis, T. P.: Constitutional Law in Greece, 
Athens-Alphen aan den Rijn (Netherlands), 2009, 71 ff.
43 In Albanian, Kushtetuta e Rrepublikës së Shqipërisë. 
44 See, in detail, Loiodice, A.–Shehu, N.: La Costituzione albanese. Bari, 1999, 16 ff. 
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rules regarding the legislative process (simple or aggravated). Among the fi rst, it was the 
best Italian constitutional comparative doctrine to highlight that the laws of Article 81 of 
the Constitution of Albania should be classifi ed in »comparative category of organic 
laws«.45 
If we consider, then, the Croatian post-Yugoslav legal system, there are also many 
similarities with the Hungarian case. The Croatian post-communist Constitution was 
adopted on December 22, 1990 (cd Christmas Constitution, in Croatian Božićni Ustav), 
entered into force in 199146 and was subsequently amended in 1998, 2000, 2001 and 2010. 
It establishes, in its current wording, that are regulated by organic laws, enacted by the 
“supermajority” of two-thirds of the members of (unicameral) Parliament, the rights of 
national minorities, as well as the provisions concerning human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, the national and local electoral systems, the organization and functioning of 
institutions and government agencies, public administration and the organization and 
powers of bodies of regional and local levels.47 In this case, the list is perhaps shorter than 
that provided by the Albanian Constitution, but does not appear altogether inferior in quality 
to that established by the new Hungarian Constitution. Despite this, the EU accession of 
Croatia–scheduled for July 1, 201348–does not seem to have encountered obstacles in that 
regard.
With regard, fi nally, to the legal system of a Central-Eastern European country that has 
already joined the European Union, stands the case of Romania, whose Constitution49 of 
1991 (amended in 2003)50 provides for the level of organic laws, which are approved by the 
affi rmative vote of a majority of the members of each House of Parliament, while the 
ordinary laws are adopted by a majority of members present in the two branches of the 
45 See the fundamental considerations of Ganino, M.: La Costituzione albanese del 1998: alla 
ricerca dell’Europa. Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo, 1999, 22 ff., and therein specifi cally p. 
33 et seq., on the Constitutional State and the system of sources. 
46 On the Croatian Constitution (Ustav Republike Hrvatske), among the so-called pioneer 
constitutions in the Eastern European countries, see Häberle, P.: The 1991 Croatian Constitution in 
the European Legal Comparison, in Politička misao – Croatian Political Science Review (edited by 
the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Zagreb, in Croatian Fakultet političkih znanosti 
Sveučilišta u Zagrebu), 2000, no. 1, 49 ff.; S. Sokol, Croatia as a Democratic Constitutional State, 
ivi, 1998, n. 3, 112 ff. 
47 See Article 83 of the present Croatian Constitution. 
48 In Croatia’s referendum on accession to the European Union, held on 22 January 2012, there 
was a clear majority in favor (two thirds of valid votes, exactly 66,27 per cent), although the turnout 
was very low, amounting to 43,51 per cent of those entitled to vote. See Traynor, I.: Croatia votes to 
join EU. Balkan state ready to become 28th member of the European Union as referendum delivers an 
overwhelming yes vote. The Guardian, 22-1-2012, where it is recalled that the Prime Minister, the 
social democrat leader Zoran Milovanović, said that »The turnout could have been better«, adding 
that »It’s not brilliant. Probably because of the situation in the country«. 
49 In Romanian, Constituţia României. 
50 See Febbrajo, A. M.: Il costituzionalismo romeno nella post-transizione. Diritto pubblico 
comparato ed europeo, 2011, 211 ff.; Tănăsescu, E. S.: Modern Romanian Constitutionalism under 
the Infl uence of EU Accession, ivi, 2011, 225 ff. On the constitutional history of Romania, see 
Febbrajo, A. M.: Modelli costituzionali nella Romania pre-comunista: una analisi comparativa. Diritto 
pubblico comparato ed europeo, 2009, 511 ff. (where references to Romanian Constitution of 1866 
and 1923).
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National Parliamentary Assembly.51 The areas assigned to the jurisdiction of the organic 
laws are very extensive, since the third paragraph of Article 73 of the Constitution of 
Romania stipulates that: »Organic laws shall regulate: a) the electoral system; the 
organization and functioning of the Permanent Electoral Authority; b) the organization, 
functioning, and fi nancing of political parties; c) the statute of Deputies and Senators, the 
establishment of their emoluments and other rights; d) the organization and holding of 
referendum; e) the organization of the Government and of the Supreme Council of National 
Defence; f) the state of partial or total mobilization of the armed forces and the state of war; 
g) the state of siege and emergency; h) criminal offences, penalties, and the execution 
thereof; i) the granting of amnesty or collective pardon; j) the statute of public servants; k) 
the contentious business falling within the competence of administrative courts; l) the 
organization and functioning of the Superior Council of Magistracy, the courts of law, the 
Public Ministry, and the Court of Audit; m) the general legal status of property and 
inheritance; n) the general organization of education; o) the organization of local public 
administration, territory, as well as the general rules on local autonomy; p) the general rules 
covering labour relations, trade unions, employers’ associations, and social protection; q) 
the status of national minorities in Romania; r) the general statutory rules of religious cults; 
s) the other fi elds for which the Constitution stipulates the enactment of organic laws«.52
3. Some useful indications about the role and functions of cardinal laws in the new 
Hungarian constitutional order can perhaps be found by examining the relevant provisions 
of the Magyar Constitution in force until December 31, 2011. It was–as known–the 
51 Thus established, respectively, by the fi rst and second paragraph of Article 76 of the 
Romanian Fundamental Law. 
52 English translation of the constitutional text is taken from the website of the Chamber of 
Deputies of Romania (http:// www. cdep. ro). In a limited number of issues, there are also organic 
laws in the Slovenian Constitution (Ustava Republike Slovenije) of 1991, amended in 1997, 2000, 
2003 and 2004. It must be remembered, in fact, that Article 80, paragraph 4, states that the electoral 
law for the National Assembly (Parliament) is approved by two-thirds majority of the members of 
Parliamentary Assembly, Article 90, paragraph 5, requires the adoption of the law on national 
referendum (legislative referendums) by the affi rm/ative vote of two thirds of the members present 
and Article 124, paragraph 1, establishes that »The form, extent and organisation of the defence of the 
inviolability and integrity of the national territory shall be regulated by a law adopted by the National 
Assembly by a two-thirds majority vote of deputies present«. See Perenič, A.: La nuova Costituzione 
slovena. Quaderni costituzionali, 1994, 307 ff.; The New Constitutional System of Slovenia, Ljubljana, 
Univerza v Ljubljani Pravna fakulteta [University of Ljubljana Faculty of Law], 1992 (Zbornik 
znanstvenih razprav-ZZR/Proceedings of scientifi c research). In the prospect of the comparison 
between the laws of the South Slavs, see also Nikolić, P.: I sistemi costituzionali dei nuovi Stati 
dell’ex-Jugoslavia, with introductory essay by S. Gambino, Torino, 2002; Marko, J.: Die neuen 
Verfassungen: Slowenien – Kroatien – Serbien. Ein Vergleich. In: Marko, J.–Borič, T. (eds): Slowenien 
– Kroatien – Serbien. Die neuen Verfassungen. Graz–Wien–Köln, 1991, 1 ff. 
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Constitution of 1949,53 amended several times both before54 the “revolutionary” events of 
1989 and (with considerable intensity) after55 those same events themselves.
It is useful to remember56 that the former Constitution provided for two types of laws, 
namely, the ordinary laws and special-majority laws. The latter, also called super-majority 
laws, were, in turn, of two types. On the one hand, there were laws to be adopted by a 
majority of two thirds of the members of Parliament present and, on the other hand, the 
laws to be approved by the super-majority of two thirds of the members of the National 
Parliamentary Assembly. The Hungarian Constitutional Court,57 in the judgment no. 1 of 
53 The Act XX of 1949 was the fi rst written constitution of Hungary. On it see, for example, 
Kovács, I.: Le droit constitutionnel, in AA.VV., Introduction au droit de la République populaire 
hongroise, Foreword of M. Ancel and Introduction of I. Szabó, Paris, 1974, 33 ff.; Péteri, Z.: The 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and the Hungarian Constitution. Acta Juridica 
Hungarica. Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies, (1991) 1–2, 57 ff.; Dobrocsi, S.: Constitutional 
History of Hungary: A Short Survey, University of Trento European Coustitutional Law Student’s 
Seminar Series. 
54 See, in the Italian-speaking literature, Lipschitz, G.: Prime considerazioni sugli emendamenti 
della Costituzione ungherese. Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico, 1984, 830 ff. 
55 See the careful reconstruction of Drinóczi, T.: Revisione e manutenzione costituzionale 
nell’ordinamento ungherese. In: Palermo, F. (ed.): La »manutenzione« costituzionale, Padova, 
CEDAM, 2007, 437 ff., and most recently, by the same author, Constitutional Politics in Contemporary 
Hungary (1991–2011), in this volume. See, also, Halmai, G.: The reform of constitutional law in 
Hungary after the transition. Legal Studies, 1998, 188 ff.; Paczolay, P.: The New Hungarian 
Constitutional State: Challenges and Perspectives. In: Howard, A. F. D. (ed.): Constitution Making in 
Eastern Europe. Washington (DC), 1993, 21 ff. Inclusive (and very detailed, for a total of 692 pages) 
of periods pre-and post-1989 is the analysis of Jakab, A.–Takacs, P.–Tatham, A. F. (eds): The 
Transformation of the Hungarian Legal Order 1985–2005, Alphen aan den Rijn (Netherlands), 2007.
56 See Dezső, M. (ed.): Constitutional Law in Hungary. Alphen aan den Rijn (Netherlands), 
2010, 63 ff.
57 For the Hungarian model of constitutional jurisdiction prior to the Constitution in force since 
2012, see Mazza, M.: Tendenze della giurisprudenza costituzionale ungherese nella prospettiva dei 
rapporti tra diritto nazionale e diritto europeo dei diritti umani. Diritto pubblico comparato ed 
europeo, 2006, 1441 ff.; Id., Rapporto Ungheria, in Ganino, M.–Filippini, C.–Di Gregorio, A.–Mazza, 
M.: Corti costituzionali e Corti europee: i casi di Federazione di Russia, Polonia, Repubblica Ceca, 
Ungheria. In: Ferrari, G. F. (ed.): Corti nazionali e Corti europee (Collana »Cinquanta anni della 
Corte costituzionale della Repubblica italiana«), Napoli, 2006, specifi cally 139 ff.; Pištan, Č.: La 
giustizia costituzionale nell’Europa centro-orientale: le esperienze di Croazia, Slovenia, Polonia, 
Ungheria. In: Mezzetti, L. (ed.): Sistemi e modelli di giustizia costituzionale. I, Padova, CEDAM, 
2009, 393 ff.; Sólyom, L.–Brunner, G.: Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy. The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court, Foreword of S.G. Breyer, Ann Arbor, 2000 (and here also, at 103–378, a wide 
selection of decisions adopted by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Hungary); Adam, A.: La 
Cour constitutionnelle en Hongrie. In: de Vergottini, G. (ed.): Giustizia costituzionale e sviluppo 
democratico nei Paesi dell’Europa centro-orientale (proceedings of the conference of Bologna, 12 
and 13-11-1999), Torino, 2000, 207 ff.; Kovács, P.: Introduction à la jurisprudence de la Cour 
constitutionnelle de la République de Hongrie. Approche Thématique. Regensburg, 2011 
(Entwicklungen im Europäischen Recht/Developments in European Law/Développements en Droit 
Européen, Bd. 1); Kerek, A.: Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Ungarn und Rumänien. Ein Vergleich der 
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeiten zweier osteuropäischer Transformationsstaaten auf ihrem Weg zum 
konsolidierten Rechtsstaat. Berlin, 2010 (Schriftenreihe zum Osteuropäischen Recht, Bd. 14). With 
respect to the control of constitutionality in the Hungarian Socialist law, see Kuss, K.-J.: New 
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1999,58 ruled that the aggravated majority established in the Constitution for the enactment 
of the law is not just a formal requirement of the legislative process, but constitute a special 
superprimary guarantee designed to protect the need of achieving broad convergence among 
members of Parliament as to the regulation of certain matters of particular relevance. 
Earlier, in the ruling no. 4 of 1993, the Hungarian Constitutional Court had held that the 
fact of requiring a special majority for approval of certain laws does not mean in any way 
creating a sort of hierarchy of fundamental rights, since organic laws are not constitutional 
parameter for ordinary laws. Again intervening in relation to the so-colled two-thirds laws, 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court decided, with the judgment no. 3 of 1997 in which are 
proposed to a large extent the arguments already made in the above-mentioned judgment 
no. 4 of 1993, that not the entire matter for which the Constitution provides the organic law 
should be regulated by organic law, i.e. by a law for whose approval is required the two-
thirds majority, but the organic law itself must ensure the direct implementation of the 
constitutional provision, subject to subsequent adoption of one or more ordinary laws for 
the discipline of detail, of course within the general framework and in accordance with the 
principles established by the special-majority law. 
With particular reference to the, politically very signifi cant, area of fundamental rights, 
that means–in the opinion of the Hungarian judges of the constitutional legitimacy–that the 
essential aspects of fundamental rights, including guarantees for the implementation of 
fundamental rights as well as limits to the constitutional restrictions of fundamental rights, 
can only be established through the adoption of special-majority laws, whereas aspects of 
detail, including any additional guarantees as well as implementing “adjustments” 
necessitated by changed circumstances, are likely to be introduced in the same fi eld by 
ordinary laws.59 Ultimately, the combined reading of decisions no. 4/1993 and no. 3/1997 
of the Hungarian Constitutional Court allowed the conclusion that the regulation of 
fundamental rights can be shared between ordinary laws and laws to be adopted by a 
majority of two thirds, provided that ordinary laws do not alter or contradict the rules 
dictated by organic laws. 
Shifting attention now from the side of constitutional adjudication to that of the 
Hungarian scholarship before the new Constitution in force since the beginning of 2012, the 
issue regarding the possibility of the control of constitutionality by the Constitutional Court 
of all laws passed by the National Parliament, both by a simple majority and by a reinforced 
majority of two thirds was fi rst successfully resolved.60 The Hungarian scholarship of public 
law had also deepened, from the point of view of the hierarchy of sources of law, the 
relations between ordinary laws and laws for whose approval a reinforced majority is 
Institutions in Socialist Constitutional Law: The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Hungarian 
Constitutional Council. Review of Socialist Law, 1986, 343 ff., where informations can be found 
concerning the Constitutional Council (in Hungarian, Alkotmányjogi Tanács) created in 1983 and 
governed by Article 21, paragraphs 3–4, of the Constitution and the Law I of 1984 on the 
Constitutional Council adopted by the Hungarian National Assembly (Parliament) April 26, 1984 
(Law on the Constitutional Council, in Hungarian Törvény az Alkotmányjogi Tanácsról).
58 For some references to this constitutional decision, see De Simone, M.: Ungheria: la nuova 
Costituzione. Verso una deriva autoritaria? Forum of Quaderni costituzionali (www. 
forumcostituzionale. it, doc. dated 16-9-2011), 8. 
59 Id est, simple majority laws.
60 In that sense, commenting on Article 32/A, paragraphs 1–2, of the Constitution previously in 
force, Dezső: Constitutional Law in Hungary. op. cit. 67.
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required.61 It was observed, in particular, that the level of special-majoirty laws is 
hierarchically higher than that of ordinary laws, as demonstrated inter alia by the 
observation that while ordinary laws cannot amend the laws to be adopted by an aggravated 
majority of two thirds, the latter can defi nitely change ordinary laws. In any case, if a law is 
passed by simple majority instead of a law adopted by a reinforced majority in an area 
reserved to organic law, ordinary law will be considered unconstitutional because it violated 
the Constitution and does not, however, because it has violated the provisions of the law 
approved by a majority of two thirds. In the wake of doctrinal elaboration, also the 
constitutional jurisprudence passed from the affi rmation that ordinary laws are different 
from laws which must be approved by a majority of two thirds only from a procedural 
standpoint, to the different position according to which the special-majority laws are to be 
placed in the hierarchy of norms on a higher level than ordinary laws.62 In particular, the 
judgment of the Constitutional Court no. 1 of 1999 explicitly stated that ordinary laws 
(adopted by simple majority) cannot in any way modify or repeal the super-majority laws, 
since the latter are compared to the fi rst in a higher position in the hierarchy of sources of 
law. If this happens, ordinary law would be unconstitutional, specifying that the violation of 
the Constitution would be in the case under consideration for failure to comply with an 
interposed rule.63
4. To conclude, it must fi rst be noted that, between December 2011 and the early 
months of 2012, many ordinary laws,64 and even some cardinal laws for the implementation 
of the new Fundamental Law, were approved by the Hungarian Parliament. The cardinal 
laws refer, in particular, to protection of the family65 and to religious freedom as well as to 
the relations between the State and religious organizations/associations.66 These laws must 
be evaluated by the Venice Commission, to which the same laws have been sent February 
21, 2012.67 
61 See Jakab, A.: A magyar jogrendszer szerkezete [The structure of the Hungarian legal 
system]. Budapest, 2007, 151 ff.
62 See, comparatively, the rulings contained in the judgments no. 4/1993 and no. 1/1999 of the 
Constitutional Court.
63 On hierarchical position and typology of interposed rules, see recently Cicconetti, S. M.: 
Tipologia, funzione, grado e forza delle norme interposte. Diritto e società, 2011, 721 ff. 
64 In his speech to the European Parliament on 18 January 2012, the Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán has spoken of 365 laws passed by the Hungarian Parliament in the fi rst twenty months after the 
elections of April 2010. 
65 Cardinal law no. CCXI of December 23, 2011. The Fundamental Law provides that cardinal 
laws for the implementation of Fundamental Law can be approved before the entry into force of the 
new Fundamental Law. With specifi c reference to the family, the new Constitution explicitly privileges 
heterosexual marriage: see Uitz, R.: Lessons from Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Central 
Europe. American Journal of Comparative Law, 2012, 235 ff. (in the prospect of the comparison with 
the Polish and Slovenian legal systems). 
66 Cardinal law no. CCVI of December 30, 2011.
67 As stated by Courrier: À propos des »évènements politiques en Hongrie«… Quelques clés 
pour en comprendre le débat juridique, op. cit., 315, »En réalité, les interrogations soulevées par les 
institutions européennes de Strasbourg ou de Bruxelles relèvent non pas tant du texte constitutionnel 
mais des “loi cardinales”«.
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Secondly, it can be observed that, in light of the comparison between the legal systems 
of Western and Eastern Europe made above,68 the areas reserved by the new Hungarian 
Fundamental Law are especially large, and have an equal perhaps only in Romanian 
constitutional law. 
Thirdly, the comparison with the Hungarian constitutional law before the entry into 
force of the Fundamental Law of 2012 shows that there was an extension of the areas 
reserved to the regulation by cardinal laws, since these areas were up to thirty-three in 
December 2011 and now, with the entry into force of the new Fundamental Law, they are 
thirty-nine.69
Ultimately, though it can be certainly said that organic laws are contemplated in many 
constitutional systems of Western countries as well as of Eastern European post-Communist 
countries, is the wideness of matters reserved to cardinals laws in Hungarian legal system 
that presents very unusual characters, so it can be assumed, even taking account of the fi rst 
cardinal laws enacted, that they serve more to make it diffi cult to change in future choices 
of the majority, rather than to ensure minorities.70 In this perspective, the new “partisan” 
Fundamental Law could also be considered a so-called core constitution (or shorter Basic 
Law), since the detailed regulation is and will be contained in the cardinal laws. 
68 See ante, in paragraph 2.
69 On this point, see Csink–Schanda–Varga (eds): The Basic Law of Hungary. A First 
Commentary, op. cit. 16.
70 Data available on the website of the Hungarian parliament (http:// www. mkogy. hu) allow to 
know that the laws, both ordinary and cardinal, have been massively voted by the majority of deputies 
belonging to Fidesz, sometimes with the participation of the opposition parliamentarians belonging to 
the far-right party Jobbik, therefore without the support of the center-left Socialist Party and the 
Greens. 
